In response to growing concerns about understanding the impact of regulation on consumers, business, and government, the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution have established the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. The primary purpose of the center is to hold lawmakers and regulators more accountable by providing thoughtful, objective analysis of existing regulatory programs and new regulatory proposals. The Joint Center builds on AEI's and Brookings's impressive body of work over the past three decades that has evaluated the economic impact of regulation and offered constructive suggestions for implementing reforms to enhance productivity and consumer welfare. The views in Joint Center publications are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, council of academic advisers, or fellows.
Executive Summary
I this paper, I present evidence on the cost-effectiveness of 76 regulatory actions promulgated by the Federal government from 1967 to 2001 by updating similar work published by the author in 1986. The paper first responds to several critiques of the original article recently published in prominent law journals by showing that most of the specific criticism is based on misrepresentations and mistakes. Wide differences in costeffectiveness indicate the possibility of saving lives more effectively. Regulations aimed at reducing safety and cardiovascular risks have been more cost-effective than regulations aimed at reducing cancer risks. The author suggests several potential regulations that could save lives more cost-effectively than the vast majority of regulations issued to date.
Saving Lives: A Review of the Record
John F. Morrall III
Introduction
In 1986, I wrote a ten-page article called "A Review of the Record" that was published in Regulation (Morrall 1986 Heinzerling (1998 Heinzerling ( , p 2069 . For example, she cites the following sample of "sources relying on one or another of Morrall's table": Breyer (1993) , Viscusi (1992) , Lutter and Morrall (1994) , Sunstein (1996 Sunstein ( , 1990 , Arrow et al (1996) , Zeckhauser and Viscusi, (1990) and Mendelhoff (1988) . 2 She states: "Morrall's calculations, in short, have been used to support every one of the most prominent critiques of the regulatory system." She cites among other things: "the Republican proposed Contract with America." (Heinzerling 1998 (Heinzerling p 1983 . She states rather colorfully: "Like other modern legends, such as stories about rats served as hamburger and alligators living in the sewers, John Morrall's story is strange and believable. It reflects the "hopes, fears, and anxieties' of modern life. And it is falsetrue." Heinzerling (1998 Heinzerling ( , p 1984 . The article is 90 pages long and contains 531 footnotes. 3 For example, see Parker (2003) and McGarity and Ruttenberg (2002) .
Hopkins, Maureen Cropper, and Randall Lutter. 4 Because of the significant contribution that good empirical analysis can make to saving lives through smarter regulation, it is important to correct erroneous charges.
The paper responds to the critiques of "A Review of the Record" by reviewing the specific criticism and revising and updating the original Heinzerling and Ackerman (2002) , McGarity and Ruttenberg (2002), and Parker (2003) . 5 "A Review of the Record" was a companion piece to "The Perils of Prudence" (Nichols and Zeckhauser 1986 ) both under the title Regulating Risk. That article explained how FDA, OSHA, and EPA regularly used upper bound estimates and conservative default assumptions for cancer risk assessment even when more plausible estimates were available.
benefits. 6 Moreover, to the extent that they did, they often used methodologies and assumptions that were inconsistent across agencies and over time.
The critiques questioned the table's benefit estimates because it discounted benefits and used estimates that were often lower than agency estimates. 7 However, as Zeckhauser and Viscusi (1990) show, regulatory decisions based on cost-effectiveness rankings that use conservative or "worst case" assumptions are undesirable because they are likely to produce less overall risk reduction than using expected values. Even though the critics believe that the regulatory system is fine and needs no reform, they presumably would applaud improvements in consistency and cost-effectiveness.
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This paper does not respond to the charge that cost-effectiveness tables and discounting are inherently flawed since others have adequately defended these methodologies, including a response to Heinzerling (1998) by Donohue (1999) states that these rules were rejected. The article (Morrall (1986, p 31) ) makes the point that "Comparing the cost-effectiveness of rules by year of issuance, agency, and legal status, the most important variable turns out to be legal status." The mean and median of 6 OMB Circular A-94 requires agencies to discount both costs and benefits when evaluating program and regulatory proposals. Before 1992, a ten percent real rate was required. In 1992, the rate was lowered to seven percent. OMB is currently considering requiring both seven and three percent as well as allowing a broader range for special circumstances. See OMB (2003) . 7 See Heinzerling (1998), Heinzerling and Ackerman (2002) , McGarity (1998), and Parker (2003) . Note that McGarity states that OMB uses a 10% rate and then uses that rate to show that even modest present costs would outweigh benefits accruing in 50 years. OMB lowered its recommended rate to 7% in 1992 and suggested in its RIA guidance that lower rates such as 4% may be more appropriate for long time horizons. 8 For example, "But the annual picture is a system striving to achieve a broad range of regulatory purposes and doing so at a reasonable costs" (Heinzerling (1998 (Heinzerling ( , p. 2069 ). 9 Heinzerling, (1998 9 Heinzerling, ( , p 2000 .
the cost per life saved of the 26 final rules was $23 million and $2 million respectively, compared to $400 million and $289 million for the eight rejected rules. Heinzerling (1998 Heinzerling ( , p. 1999 Heinzerling (1998) cites EPA's phase down of lead in gasoline as one example.
OIRA has often pointed to EPA's RIA, which it formally reviewed and approved, as an
analysis of high quality that shows benefits significantly exceeding costs. However, the estimated benefits were primarily due to the reduced damage to catalytic converters and related car repair /maintenance matters, which were greater than the costs of the standard (Morgenstern (1997, p 56) Heinzerling (1998) charges that the table is also biased because it does not report cost per life saved for regulations that were never (but she believes should have been)
proposed by the agencies. Although it seems a little disingenuous to criticize the table for containing regulations that "do not exist," and at the same time suggest that regulations that "do not exist" be included, the overall point is a good one. The final section suggests several candidate regulations that may save lives more cost-effectively than many of the regulations that have been issued up to now.
Heinzerling (1998, p. 2017) ends this section by stating that "In OMB's hands, cost-benefit analyses became a one-way ratchet; it was used to criticize proposals for regulation, never to criticize foreclosures to regulate. Heinzerling (1998 Heinzerling ( , p 2014 . 13 Elsewhere Heinzerling (1998) is critical of the table because she claims it does not take into account non-health benefits. One way to reduce that problem is to include rules only if a significant majority of their benefits arise from health improvements. By the way, she is incorrect in her charge that non-health benefits were not included. Monetized nonhealth benefits were subtracted from costs while non-fatality health benefits were weighed using willingness-to-pay estimates and used to construct fatality equivalent indexes. 14 See OMB (2003) . According to the report, EPA's Office of Air provided over 75% of the benefits provided by the federal government's executive branch regulations that could be estimated.
OMB in particular. Since most of the regulations at the bottom of the cost-effectiveness rankings were rejected by the agencies, a fact she applauds and uses to argue that regulatory reform is unnecessary, it is contradictory to argue that the rejected regulations should not have been rejected.
Claim #4. The table presents problematic cost per life estimates because of discounting.
15
Although analysts debate the actual discount rate to be used, they do not debate the necessity of discounting both future costs and benefits. However, Heinzerling also makes specific charges about the table that do need to be addressed. First, in her Table 2, she compares estimates of the cost per life saved for three regulations that appear in an article by Broder and Morrall (1983) Heinzerling (1998 Heinzerling ( , p 2020 presents the differences as if there is some sort of inconsistency or flaw. She also states:
"These large differences must be due to discounting, as this is the only methodological difference between the two sets of estimates." She apparently arrived at this conclusion without full investigation.
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She also draws comparison between the arsenic copper smelter and glass manufacturing plant rules, and reports huge differences between my estimates and her calculation based on agency estimates, which she attributes to discounting. As pointed 15 See Heinzerling (1998 Heinzerling ( , p. 2018 . 16 The differences are also due to inflation adjustments since the 1986 estimates were in 1984 dollars. For asbestos, the inflation adjustment of 2.23 accounted for more than half of the "almost 40 times" growth. This mistake also leads her to mistakenly calculate that I used a 37-year latency period for the OSHA arsenic rule while using 15 for the glass plant rule. I used 20 years not 37 years for the 1978 OSHA rule and 15 years for the later 1986 EPA rule, based on information in the EPA rulemaking record. (Heinzerling (1998) p 2056, fn 469)). out above, she confuses the various arsenic regulatory proposals, which has the effect of overstating the effect of discounting.
Claim #5. Morrall adjusted the agencies' estimates of actual risk.
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This statement is true, but old news; I stated it in "A Review of the Record." As Garber (1999) filing, they would have learned that the differences are based on OMB's "weight of the evidence" approach rather than OSHA's use of the single animal study that found the greatest risk of cancer among rats exposed to formaldehyde. 22 The OMB estimate used 20 Neither cites the filing in their article. 21 See Heinzerling (1998 Heinzerling ( , p 2026 . These estimates are undiscounted for latency. 22 Parker (2003, p 50) asks the question (even after I had offered to give him the answer): "Where does Morrall's $72 billion figure come from in any case?" After assuming that I used a 40 year latency period (I used 35 years as did the OMB filing) and making a series of other assumptions, he states "Morrall must have arbitrarily multiplied the agency's cost figures by a factor of 20." I said in the paper that I accepted agency cost estimates (Morrall (1986 p 29) ).
the risk model that OSHA claimed fit the data the best (a five-stage model used by the Consumer Product Safety Commission). In addition, in an innovative meta-analysis, OMB included data from all six animal studies that had exposed rodents to formaldehyde up to that date, which included mice and hamsters as well as rats. Using a "weight of the evidence" approach significantly lowers the risk estimates for humans, and is entirely appropriate since there is no evidence that rats are better predictors of human risks than mice or hamsters.
To prove that the OMB estimates were too low, Heinzerling and Parker both quote an OSHA staff member who questioned the use of meta-analysis and disparaged OMB economists for not being toxicologists (Heinzerling (1998 (Heinzerling ( , pp. 2026 answer critics who believe that lives should not be discounted, Table 2 uses the future expected value of the cost of saving lives at the times in the future when lives are saved.
The fact that the two approaches are mathematically equivalent may not mollify the critics, but it does reduce their rhetorical appeal. For the same reason, Table 2 also uses the term "statistical lives" as small risks are being reduced and not identifiable lives.
30 Table 2 presents the "opportunity costs of statistical lives saved" (OCSLS Table 2 confirms the main conclusions of my 1986 article, as well as Tengs, et al (1995) , that presented cost per life-year saved estimates for 587 interventions, many of Since Breyer (1993) based his Table 5 on that data and many others used Breyer's table, e.g., Kniesner and Viscusi (2003) future citations should be to table 2. However, the mistake did not significantly change the rankings. 30 As with the earlier paper, a fatality index, weighted by WTP estimates, was added to the denominator to take into account non-fatality health benefits and non-health benefits subtracted from the numerator to produce net costs. 31 Note that the value of the table is as an indicator of overall regulatory performance. The point estimates in the table should not be used alone to judge the worth of specific regulations because of the limited information they convey and their inherent uncertainty. 32 Partly because of the difficulty of explicitly valuing health benefits, OMB has proposed in its new draft guidelines that agency "prepare a CEA for all major rulemakings for which the primary benefits are improved public health and safety," (OMB 2003, p. 5516) in addition to a traditional Benefit-Cost Analysis when feasible.
Results for 76 Final Regulations
which were medical interventions.
33
The range of cost-effectiveness among rules continues to be enormous. The range is six orders of magnitude from OSHA's 1998 respiratory protection rule to EPA's 1991 solid waste disposal facility criteria, compared to three orders of magnitude for the final rules in the 1986 table.
Second, toxin control, primarily cancer cases avoided, continues to be a significantly less cost-effective intervention than safety regulation. Using the $7 million
Value of Statistical Life (VSL) estimate, which is the midrange of the Viscusi and Aldy (2003) meta-analysis of the better willingness to pay market studies, most clearly illustrates this conclusion. Thirty-one of the 35 regulations aimed at reducing safety risk pass this benefit-cost test compared to only six of the 34 regulations aimed primarily at cancer.
In addition to these 71 regulations, six regulations fall into different categories.
All of these fall under the $7 million cutoff. Four are aimed primarily at cardiovascular disease; HHS's organ donor and food labeling, FAA's AEDs on large planes, and EPA's NOX SIP Call regulations. Two others are medical interventions: HHS's medical devices and mammography regulations. The sixth regulation, OSHA's 1998 respirator rule, which is aimed at both acute and chronic toxins, was the most cost-effective of the 76 rules. These findings are also consistent with the Tengs, et al (1995) findings that medical and safety interventions were significantly more cost-effective than toxin controls.
Another key cutoff point is where cost-ineffective regulations do more harm than good. Because resources are used to produce the benefits of risk reducing regulation, some of which would have been used to reduce risk in the absence of the regulation, there is an opportunity cost to spending that can be measured in risk reduction. The theoretical underpinnings and empirical estimates for this cutoff point have been developed in articles by Lutter and Morrall (1994) , who called this approach the "Health-Health
Analysis," and by Viscusi (1994) . Lutter, Morrall, and Viscusi (1999) reconciled their 33 The medical and public health literature tends to use life-years saved rather than lives saved. Using life-years saved as pointed out in Morrall (1986) increases the variances in the effectiveness estimates and strengthens the conclusions. For example see Viscusi, Hakes, and Carlin (1997) who find that using life years saved rather than lives saved based on a variant of my table increases the variance. Using the $21 million cutoff indicates that 27 of the 76 regulations in Table 2 cause more harm than good. Over time, the cost-effectiveness of life saving regulations in this sample has not significantly changed. About 58% of the rules pass the benefit-cost test implied by using the $7 million VSL, and 65% of the rules pass the health-health test using the $21 million cutoff. These percentages are virtually unchanged when the sample is divided between the 42 rules issued before 1990, and the 34 rules issued in 1990 and after. One might conclude that OMB and the agencies are not improving their regulatory performance over time.
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On the other hand, since one might expect that the most cost-effective opportunities to save lives might be chosen first, then there should be a tendency for the cost-per-life-saved estimates to increase over time. Moreover, since VSL is a normal good with an income elasticity of 0.5 to 0.6 according to Viscusi and Aldy (2002) , implicit cost-per-life-saved estimates should also increase over time for that reason. The fact that this has not happened may indicate that the agencies and OMB have had some success.
The critics point out that tables such as Tables 1 and 2 Farrow and Toman (1999) , Hahn (1999) and Farrow (2000) . 35 However, as in Morrall 1986 , I have attempted to include all the rules published in the Federal Register whose primary benefits were saving lives and for which reasonably complete information on risks, cost and benefits was available.
whole are cost-ineffective. OMB's annual Report to Congress on the Cost and Benefits of Federal Regulation has consistently found that EPA regulations produce the great majority of benefits. For example, the latest OMB report finds that four EPA rules (two aimed at reducing emissions from heavy duty highway engines, the Tier 2 rule limiting emissions from light duty trucks, and an acid rain rule) provide 70% of the benefits and 20% of the costs for 107 major rules reviewed over the last ten years whose benefits and costs could be monetized. 36 The overall benefits of the 107 rules ranged from $135 billion to $218 billion with costs of $38 billion to $44 billion. However, since the four EPA rules' benefits mainly flow from reducing fine particulate matter, a finding that regulations aimed narrowly at specific carcinogens does not appear to be cost-effective relative to other life saving opportunities appears sound. This was a key finding of "A Review of the Record," and remains a key finding of this review.
Recommendations for Further Regulation
One point that the critics of these tables make is that they do not indicate that cost-effective opportunities to regulate exist, since the regulations listed in the table have already been issued (Heinzerling, 1998 (Heinzerling, , pp 2014 (Heinzerling, -2117 . OMB (2002b) has recently begun an effort to encourage the agencies to consider actions in a number of specific areas by sending them "prompt letters." Table 2 , the cost-per-life-year tables of Tengs, et al (1995) , and the OMB Benefit-Cost Report (2003) all suggest that further regulation to reduce cardiovascular diseases may provide cost-effective opportunities to save lives.
37 Table 3 lists several such potential opportunities. The FDA proposed two of these ideas.
In 1999, the FDA proposed to reduce the intake of trans fatty acids by requiring labeling. 39 The four proposals save lives at a cost of $3,000 for reducing the intake of trans fat to $830,000 for requiring bar codes.
Taken together, the four suggestions save 35,600 lives per year at a weighted average cost per life of $230,000, which ranks near the top in Table 2 . These results suggest we could do a significantly better job saving lives.
Summary
The Second, the policy conclusions from the new table are similar to the original findings. 39 The calculations for the two proposed rules are based on data from the RIAs. The calculations for the omega-3 suggestion is based on the cost of one extra helping of fish every three months and a dose response estimate from Lutter and Tucker (2003) based on risk data from the Journal of the American Medical Association (Hu et al 2002) . The calculations for AEDs in the workplace are based on cost data from the FAA AED in large airplane rulemaking and risk and effectiveness estimates from Page et al (2000) published in the New England Journal of Medicine. It is based on placing one AED within five minutes of 100 workers.
Wide differences in cost-effectiveness indicate we could do a more effective and efficient job saving lives. In particular, it finds that regulations aimed at reducing safety and cardiovascular risks have been more cost-effective than regulations narrowly aimed at reducing cancer risks. Finally, the paper suggests several potential regulations aimed at cardiovascular risks that appear to save lives more cost-effectively than a majority of regulations issued in the past. 
